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Abstract
I argue against the currently-prevalent view that algebraic quantum
field theory (AQFT) is the correct framework for philosophy of quantum
field theory and that “conventional” quantum field theory (CQFT), of the
sort used in mainstream particle physics, is not suitable for foundational
study. In doing so, I defend that position that AQFT and CQFT should
be understood as rival programs to resolve the mathematical and physical
pathologies of renormalization theory, and that CQFT has succeeded in
this task and AQFT has failed. I also defend CQFT from recent criticisms
made by Doreen Fraser.
1 Prelude: a fable
Once upon a time there was a community of physicists. This community be-
lieved, and had good reason to believe, that quantum mechanics, not classical
mechanics, was the right framework in which to do physics. They also had
a good understanding, at the classical level, of the dynamics of solid bodies
(vibrations in crystals, for instance): they knew, for example, that some such
bodies could be analysed using Lagrangians like
ℒ = 1
2
휙˙2 − 1
2
(∇휙)2 + (higher terms) (1)
where 휙(푥) is the displacement of the part of the crystal which is at position 푥
at equilibrium.
But the physicists were sad, because they knew nothing at all about the
microscopic structure of matter, and so they did not have a good quantum
theory of vibrations in crystals or of other solid-matter dynamics.
So one day, they set out to quantize their classical theories of solid mat-
ter. At first, they tried to do it naively, by putting the classical theory into
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Hamiltonian form and replacing classical observables with self-adjoint opera-
tors. This worked quite well until the higher-order terms in (1) were included.
But when the physicists tried to include those higher order terms, the theory
became mathematically very badly behaved — all the calculations contained
integrals that diverged to infinity.
Soon the physicists discovered that they could extract working calculational
results if they just assumed that displacements couldn’t vary on arbitrarily
short lengthscales. This amounted to “cutting off” the range of integration in
the divergent integrals, so that they got a finite result. When they did their
calculations this way, the answers agreed very well with experiment.
But the physicists were still sad. “It’s ad hoc”, they said. “It’s inelegant”,
they lamented. “It conflicts with the Euclidean symmetries of solid matter”,
they cried.
So they went back to basics, and looked for an axiomatised, fully rigorous
quantum theory, with displacements definable on arbitrarily short lengthscales
and with exact Euclidean symmetries.
And to this day, they are still looking.
2 Introduction
Quantum field theory (QFT) certainly seems like an appropriate subject for
philosophy of physics. It deserves to be called the great success story of post-
war theoretical physics, with applications ranging far beyond its original home
in particle physics and encompassing an increasingly large part of condensed-
matter physics and statistical mechanics; if gravitational phenomena (and, per-
haps, the quantum measurement problem) are set aside, it appears to provide
a satisfactory underpinning for the whole of physics; its empirical successes in-
clude predictions which are confirmed to double-figure numbers of significant
figures.
And indeed, QFT has had a significant, and increasing, degree of attention
from philosophers of physics in recent years. But in much of this work1, it is
not really clear that what these philosophers are studying is the same quantum
field theory which has achieved all these theoretical triumphs. For the dominant
framework in which “philosophy of quantum field theory” is conducted is so-
called algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT), the result of a program to put
QFT on a rigorous footing which began with the axiomatic QFT developed by
Wightman and co-workers in the 1960s, and which has been extensively studied
by mathematical physicists in the interim. (For a reasonably up-to-date account
of AQFT, see Haag (1996).)
Philosophers who work on AQFT are, naturally, quite aware of the difference
between AQFT and “what the physicists do”. Halvorson (2007) notes explicitly,
in the introduction to a monograph on AQFT, that
1Examples include Baker (2009), Baker and Halvorson (2009), Clifton and Halvorson
(2001), Earman (2004), Earman and Fraser (2006), Fraser (2008), Halvorson (2007), Ruetsche
(2002), and Ruetsche (2003).
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From the title of this Chapter [Algebraic Quantum Field Theory],
one might suspect that the subject is some idiosyncratic approach to
quantum field theory (QFT). The approach is indeed idiosyncratic in
the sense of demographics: only a small proportion of those [physi-
cists] who work on QFT work on algebraic QFT (AQFT). However,
there are particular reasons why philosophers, and others interested
in foundational issues, will want to study the algebraic approach.
What are these “particular reasons”? Basically: that AQFT is on a mathemat-
ically very firm footing, and that “standard” QFT (let me call it ‘conventional
quantum field theory, or CQFT”2) is mathematically far too ill-defined for foun-
dational study. As Halvorson goes on to say,
philosophers of physics have taken their object of study to be the-
ories, where theories correspond to mathematical objects (perhaps
sets of models). But it is not so clear where “quantum field theory”
can be located in the mathematical universe. In the absence of some
sort of mathematically intelligible description of QFT, the philoso-
pher of physics has two options: either find a new way to understand
the task of interpretation, or remain silent about the interpretation
of quantum field theory.
It is for this reason that AQFT is of particular interest for the foun-
dations of quantum field theory. In short, AQFT is our best story
about where QFT lives in the mathematical universe, and so is a
natural starting point for foundational inquiries.
In a previous paper (Wallace 2006), I argued that in fact CQFT can be put
on a mathematical footing secure enough to do perfectly adequate foundational
work. In this paper, I want to review that argument, and then to make explicit
the too-tacit implication of that paper: that given that CQFT is foundationally
adequate, there is really no reason to regard AQFT as a ‘natural starting point’
— or as any starting point at all — for foundational enquiries into QFT.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 3, I make the case that
CQFT and AQFT should be seen as rival research programs, attempting in
different ways to solve the problem of infinities in QFT. In sections 4 and 5 I
explain how CQFT and AQFT, respectively, set out to solve that problem; in
sections 6–7 I compare their respective successes and conclude (a) that CQFT
is decisively more successful, and (b) its success undermines reasons for being
interested in AQFT. In sections 8–9, I consider possible objections to this con-
clusion — in particular (in section 8), I critically assess a recent paper by Doreen
Fraser (Fraser 2009) where she defends the strategy of using exclusively AQFT
for foundational work on quantum field theory. Section 10 is the conclusion.
A disclaimer before I begin. I’m obviously not arguing that quantum me-
chanics can’t be given an algebraic formulation: that’s a straightforward math-
ematical fact. Nor am I arguing that algebraic methods do not sometimes —
2In Wallace (2006) I called it ‘Lagrangian quantum field theory’; I now feel that name was
a little misleading.
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do not frequently — give insight into the behaviour of quantum systems with
infinitely many degrees of freedom: of course they do. By “algebraic quantum
field theory”, I don’t simply mean “quantum field theory, studied by algebraic
methods”.
So what do I mean by “AQFT”? The short answer is “quantum field the-
ory, formulated via something like the axioms in Streater and Wightman (1964),
Haag (1996) or Halvorson (2007), crucially including the assumption that quan-
tum fields are operator- (or algebra-element-)valued distributions, so that field
operators (or algebra elements) can be associated with arbitrarily small open
subsets of spacetime.” But to get a more informative answer, it will be useful
to review just why the algebraic approach developed in the first place.
3 AQFT and CQFT as rival programs
As is widely known,3 the original attempts — by Dirac, Jordan, Heisenberg and
others — to develop quantum field theory foundered on the problem of infinities:
attempts to calculate physical quantities just led to divergent integrals. Feyn-
man, Tomonaga, Schwinger and Dyson sidestepped the problem by inventing a
mathematical method — so-called renormalization — to remove the infinities.
In doing so , they made quantum electrodynamics into a predictively powerful
framework whose accuracy is still unsurpassed — but renormalization made lit-
tle mathematical or physical sense. In this situation — and given the difficulties
of extending quantum-field-theoretic methods beyond quantum electrodynam-
ics — it was entirely reasonable for a group of mathematical physicists to try
to put the subject on solid conceptual footing by writing down sensible axioms
for a quantum field theory, and then looking for models for those axioms. As
Streater and Wightman say in the introduction to their classic (1964) text,
[T]he quantum theory of fields never reached a stage where one could
say with confidence that it was free from internal contradictions
— nor the converse. In fact, the Main Problem of quantum field
theory turned out to be to kill it or cure it: either to show that
the idealizations involved in the fundamental notions of the theory
(relativistic invariance, quantum mechanics, local fields, etc.) are
incompatible in some physical sense, or to recast the theory in such
a form that it provides a practical language for the description of
elementary particle dynamics.
As of 1964, then, it would not have been unreasonable to see quantum field
theory as being in the same foundational state as quantum mechanics in the
late 1920s (that is, in the form proposed by Dirac (1930), with his extensive
3In this section, I greatly simplify the actual history of quantum field theory, which is
Byzantine in its complexity. My purpose is more pedagogical than historical, and only the
broadest brush-strokes will be significant for my purposes. For a much more historically careful
account, see Cao (1997).
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use of position eigenstates, delta functions, and the like) — predictively pow-
erful, but resting on mathematically ill-defined notions — and to see Streater,
Wightman et al as attempting to play von Neumann (or perhaps Gelfand)4 to
Feynman/Tomonaga/Schwinger/Dyson’s Dirac. And as of 2009, philosophers
of physics seem to regard the situation as essentially unchanged: conventional
quantum field theory remains conceptually ill-formed; the axiomatic approach
(and its algebraic successor) remains the natural way to solve this problem; if
progress has been slow, this just reflects the intrinsic difficulty of the subject.
But forty-five years have passed. And they have seen theoretical physicists
(notably Kenneth Wilson and John Kogut, in the early 1970s) approach the
problem of renormalization from a very different direction. In doing so, these
physicists made assumptions which directly contradicted some of the basic as-
sumptions of the AQFT program: crucially, they assumed that instead of being
definable on arbitrarily small spacetime regions, quantum field theory would
break down at some short lengthscales. They worked out the general structure
of a quantum theory with such a short-distance breakdown, and in doing so
they not only put renormalization on a sound theoretical footing, but produced
a general explanatory framework which yielded rich results both in particle
physics and in condensed matter physics. (Because the short-distance break-
down of QFT used in this model is often called the ‘cutoff’, CQFT can be taken
to stand for cutoff quantum field theory as readily as conventional quantum field
theory.)
Given these more recent developments, it is no longer appropriate — if ever it
was — to see AQFT as the proposed mathematically-rigorous version of CQFT.
The two are better understood as rival research programs, trying in different
ways to resolve the problem of renormalization. They make incompatible, and
in principle empirically testable, physical assumptions. And — as I will argue in
the next three sections — judged as research programs, one of those programs
has basically been unsuccessful, and one has been fantastically successful. No
prizes for guessing which is which.
4 Understanding renormalization in CQFT
One of the revolutions in post-1960s quantum field theory has been the appli-
cation of QFT methods to condensed-matter physics, and the flow of ideas in
both directions between condensed-matter and particle physics. In particular,
ideas from condensed-matter physics strongly influenced Wilson and Kogut in
their analysis of renormalization, and the condensed-matter approach to renor-
malization will be a useful starting point for our purposes.
In (real, not fabled!) condensed-matter physics,5 solid bodies (metals, crys-
tals and the like) look like continuous systems — i. e. , fields — on large scales,
4von Neumann (1955) reformulated quantum mechanics in a way which made no use of
position eigenstates or delta functions; Gelfand et al (1964) gave a rigorous mathematical
reformulation of both.
5Here I mostly follow Binney et al (1992).
5
and so formally it is possible to apply QFT methods to them in just the same
way as for “real” field theories. Just as in particle physics, though (and just as
in the fable), this leads to integrals which diverge at short distances. In solid
state physics, though, there is no particular reason to be surprised by this: the
system being studied obviously cannot be treated as a continuum at arbitrarily
short lengthscales, since on atomic scales matter has a discrete structure, so no
wonder that the theory produces pathological results if we assume that it can
be so treated.
This suggests that the divergent integrals should be evaluated not up to
infinite momenta (that is, down to zero lengthscales) but should instead be ‘cut
off’ at a lengthscale of ∼ 10−10m. But:
∙ Any (remotely simple) way of implementing this cutoff will inevitably be
very crude and inexact: the way in which the approximation of treating
the system as a continuum breaks down will realistically be much more
complicated than any simple cutoff can capture.
∙ This ought to matter, because the short-distance interactions are much
stronger than the longer-distance ones, and so we are crudely oversimpli-
fying the dynamics exactly in the place where we would expect them to
be most important.
This is where modern renormalization theory comes in. It establishes that the
details do not after all matter for many purposes — because if we choose to
implement the short-distance cutoff in two different ways, the only effects sig-
nificant at lengthscales much longer than the cutoff lengthscales are changes
in the coefficients of finitely many additional interaction terms, known as the
renormalizable interactions. (Other interactions, the “nonrenormalizable” in-
teractions, may be present but will become arbitrarily weak on lengthscales
sufficiently long with respect to the cutoff lengthscale.)
For instance, in scalar condensed-matter systems (that is, systems where we
can treat the relevant degree of freedom as a scalar field on long distance scales),
these terms are
휙2 휙˙2 (∇휙)2 휙4. (2)
So — as long as we are interested in the behaviour of the system on length-
scales long compared with the cutoff length — we can absorb all our ignorance
of how the cutoff is implemented into the values of finitely many coefficients
which can be measured empirically. To be sure, if we want to calculate those
coefficients from first principles (from atomic quantum mechanics, say) then we
will need to engage with all the messy details of the cutoff — indeed, in practice
we will have to stop using quantum-field-theoretic methods altogether. But as
long as we are happy to treat them as empirical parameters, the details of the
cutoff process are irrelevant.
To reiterate: the moral of the story is that condensed-matter QFT, on
lengthscales≫ 10−10m, is totally insensitive to the details of the short-distance
physics, except insofar as it determines the numerical values of the coefficients.
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All we need is some kind of freezing out of the short distance degrees of freedom
— exactly how that freezing out is implemented is irrelevant.
But if this works in condensed-matter QFT, nothing prevents us telling
exactly the same story in particle physics, provided only that something freezes
out the short-distance degrees of freedom on some lengthscale far below what
current experimental physics can probe. This might be done, for instance, by
∙ Another field theory (though of course, that field theory in turn will need
some kind of short-distance cutoff)
∙ A non-field theory, without its own infinities (string theory is expected by
its proponents to be such a theory)
∙ A real lattice structure to space (seems inelegant, but who knows?)
∙ A discretisation of spacetime of the kind constructed in loop quantum
gravity (as described by, e. g. , Rovelli (2004)) — much more elegant than
the real lattice route, and (it is hoped) relativistically covariant.
∙ Some as-yet-unimagined solution.
Renormalization theory itself tells us that if there is a short-distance cutoff,
large-scale phenomenology will give us almost no information about its nature.
As in condensed-matter physics, the only effect of changing the form of the
cutoff is to rescale the parameters in the theory’s Lagrangian.
We are, to be sure, more limited in particle physics than in condensed-matter
quantum field theory. In the latter case, we have both the large-scale theory —
quantum field theory — and the small-scale theory — the quantum mechanics of
the atomic constituents. In the former case, we have only the large-scale theory
theory. This means, in particular, that while the values of the renormalized
parameters can be calculated (in principle) within condensed-matter physics,
they can only be measured empirically within particle physics. But in particle
physics, as in condensed-matter physics, the only significance at the large scale
of the microphysical details — and, in particular, the only significance of the
short-distance cutoff — is in setting the values of those parameters.
This, in essence, is how modern particle physics deals with the renormal-
ization problem:6 it is taken to presage an ultimate failure of quantum field
theory at some short lengthscale, and once the bare existence of that failure is
appreciated, the whole of renormalization theory becomes unproblematic, and
indeed predictively powerful in its own right.
Before considering that predictive power, though, we should look at the
competition. How does AQFT deal with renormalization?
6I don’t intend my argument in this paper to be sociological: it is no part of my thesis that
working physicists (by which I mean, roughly: those who use QFT for concrete calculations)
all think about renormalization this way. But for what it’s worth, my anecdotal impression
is that most do: or rather, most of those who worry about renormalization in the first place
do. (As in discussions of the quantum measurement problem, a sizable fraction of physicists
take a ‘shut up and calculate’ attitude.)
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5 Understanding renormalization in AQFT
As I have already noted, algebraic quantum field theory deals with the para-
doxes of renormalization by going back to first principles. Instead of writing
down concrete examples of quantum field theories (using the admittedly deeply
unattractive method of starting with a classical field and then “quantizing” it),
which associated field operators to every spacetime point, and then trying to
modify those theories to get rid of the infinities, the AQFT theorist writes down
a formal mathematical framework which ought to be satisfied by any mathe-
matically acceptable quantum field theory.
Crucially, that framework includes the assumption that quantum fields,
though they cannot be defined at points without leading to mathematical patholo-
gies, can be defined on arbitrarily small spacetime regions. (In the earlier ax-
iomatic approach, this amounted to replacing an (operator-valued) quantum
field with an operator-valued distribution, a map from smooth functions to op-
erators, intuitively understandable as the integral of the operator field weighted
by that smooth function. In more recent versions, the quantum field is replaced
by an algebra net: a map from open subsets of spacetime to 퐶∗-algebras. See
Haag (1996) for the details.)
Once such a framework has been written down, it is possible to prove a great
many fully rigorous theorems, which apply to any quantum theory satisfying
those axioms. And many such theorems have indeed been proved; many have
real mathematical beauty and importance. (Halvorson (2007) reviews some of
this work.)
But none of this work means anything physical at all unless these axioms
really do describe the quantum field theories that exist in nature. So in parallel
with the search for general results, AQFT theorists have looked for concrete
examples of quantum field theories which satisfy the axioms.
They made some initial success. It was recognised very early on that non-
interacting quantum field theories — theories of free electrons, free photons,
and the like — can readily be incorporated into the formal framework. Not
much later, Glimm and Jaffe (1968) succeeded in constructing a two-spacetime-
dimensional scalar quantum field theory with an interaction term (휆휙4) which
was exactly definable without cutoffs. The obvious next step was to look for
interacting theories in four spacetime dimensions: perhaps toy models to begin
with, but ultimately, rigorous versions of the interacting field theories used in
mainstream particle physics. Despite forty years of work, though, no such theory
has ever been found: the only known physically realistic algebraic quantum field
theories in four dimensions are free-field theories.
Another way to look at the situation may be helpful. As noted above,
physicists classify interaction terms into renormalizable and non-renormalizable.
This can be understood in physical terms via the renormalization theory of the
previous section; it can also, though, be defined mathematically in terms of
the behaviour of the short-distance divergences in the integrals that appear
in the perturbative expansion of the interaction due to that term. Among
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the renormalizable terms, though, are so-called super-renormalizable terms:7
those which lead to infinities in at most a finite number of elements in the
perturbative expansion. The 휆휙4 term in two-dimensional scalar field theory is
super-renormalizable, and so it would be unsurprising to find that the theory
can be reformulated, without a cutoff, just by modifying the Hamiltonian to
remove precisely the divergent terms in the perturbative series. Glimm and
Jaffe’s rigorous, cutoff-free field theory does precisely that. But the trick will
not work for interactions which are not super-renormalizable. No-one has yet
succeeded in constructing an interacting field theory whose interaction terms
are not super-renormalizable. And in four spacetime dimensions, no interaction
terms are super-renormalizable.
However we look at it, though, the result is the same, and cannot be stressed
enough. There is no known physically realistic interacting algebraic
quantum field theory in four dimensions.
6 Comparing research programs: CQFT versus
AQFT
I argued in section 3 that CQFT and AQFT, because they take different and
conceptually incompatible approaches to the problem of renormalization, should
be understood as rival research programs and evaluated on that basis. We’ve
now reviewed each program; how do they compare to one another?
To begin with the “conventional” or “cutoff” approach: CQFT makes a very
large number of novel empirical predictions. Chief amongst these are the hun-
dreds of cross-sections, decay rates, mass ratios, resonances, magnetic moments,
and the like, calculable within the Standard Model and empirically confirmed:
the only way we know to make mathematical and physical sense of the Standard
Model is via CQFT, so it doesn’t seem unreasonable to count the quantitative
predictions of the Standard Model as predictions of CQFT. (If AQFT could also
reproduce those predictions, they would equally count as novel predictions of
AQFT; it can’t.) Increasingly, the methods of lattice QCD allow us to extend
the quantitative predictions of the theory beyond the region where scattering
theory is applicable, and to calculate the mass spectrum of baryons and mesons
with increasing (though still fairly low) accuracy.8
Over and above these specific predictions, CQFT provides an explanatory
framework for the whole of particle-physics phenomenology, and one in which the
details of renormalization theory play a central role. Amongst the explanatory
successes of this framework are:9
7Many textbooks do not regard the super-renormalizable terms as renormalizable; this is
just a matter of definition.
8See Kalloniatis, Leinweber, and Willians (2005) for a fairly recent review of progress in
this field.
9See Peskin and Schroeder (1995), Cheng and Li (1984) or any other sufficiently advanced
QFT textbook for details.
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∙ “asymptotic freedom”: the feature of QCD whereby the effective coupling
constant decreases in strength as we consider shorter- and shorter-distance
interactions.
∙ The particular functional form of the Lagrangian of any interaction, given
only the symmetry properties of the fields in that Lagrangian: whatever
the short-distance form of the dynamics, the effective Lagrangian appro-
priate for physics at lengthscales long compared to the cutoff will contain
all and only the renormalizable interaction terms.
∙ The reason that the weak interaction is weak: the weak interaction be-
tween e. g. , electrons and neutrinos can be modelled as a four-fermion
interaction, cut off at energy levels of ∼ 80GeV (the mass of the W bo-
son) by the (spontaneously broken) electroweak interaction; a 4-fermion
interaction term is nonrenormalizable, and so will be very weak at energy
scales low compared to that cutoff level.
∙ Anomalous symmetry breaking: the process whereby classical symmetries
cannot be preserved by any renormalization scheme, and therefore are
violated by radiative-correction terms in the theory.
∙ The reason why internal symmetries of field theories are always repre-
sented irreducibly: renormalization will cause the coupling constants, in-
cluding the masses, of different irreducible components in a reducible rep-
resentation to shift relative to one another.10
∙ The reason for the close analogies between condensed-matter and particle-
physics QFT.
So judged by the usual standards of science — wideness of applicability, predic-
tive accuracy, explanatory and unificatory power — CQFT is doing pretty well
. . . to put it mildly.
What about AQFT? Being uncharitable, it makes no (non-falsified) empir-
ical predictions whatsoever, because the world we live in manifestly has (a)
interactions and (b) four (or more) spacetime dimensions, and we have no in-
teracting algebraic quantum field theories in four dimensions. Even
being charitable: the only empirical predictions of AQFT are general results
(the spin-statistics theorem, the CPT theorem, etc.) which are also derivable
(by the usual standards used in theoretical physics) in CQFT (perhaps only as
extremely good approximations, depending on whether the world is Poincare´-
covariant at the fundamental level.)
It is no part of my argument to object to the first-order project of continuing
to look for interacting AQFTs. (It’s not the research project I’d put money on,
but what do I know?) But in the absence of any such theories — and in the
presence of a rival program which has been spectacularly successful — there
is, at present, just no reason to expect that program to succeed. And if so,
10For more on this point, see Wallace (2009, section 7).
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philosophers of physics should not be studying that research program in the
expectation that they will learn about the structure of reality in doing so.
7 Another problem for AQFT: why trust claims
about the arbitrarily small?
For the sake of argument, let us put aside the lack of positive reasons to expect
that an empirically adequate AQFT could be constructed. Is there anything
about the success of CQFT that actually rules them out?
One argument might run as follows:11
1. We have a very well confirmed theory (the Standard Model, understood
as a CQFT), one of whose central claims is that field degrees of freedom
are frozen out at sufficiently short lengthscales.
2. As good scientific realists, we should tentatively accept that claim as ap-
proximately true.
3. Since AQFT denies that claim, its basic structure is wrong.
4. So no wonder that we can’t construct empirically adequate theories within
that structure!
This is a little too quick, though. CQFT, in itself, doesn’t actually require the
existence of a cutoff; it just tells us that assuming a cutoff suffices to make the
theory well-defined (and that, having assumed it, the details of how it is imposed
are irrelevant at long lengthscales). It is consistent with the CQFT framework
that the theory’s degrees of freedom after all remain defined on arbitrarily short
lengthscales.
Now, some specific QFTs do (appear to) rule out this possibility.12 In quan-
tum electrodynamics, in particular, the strength of the interaction appears to
increase without limit as we study the theory on shorter and shorter length-
scales, and in fact is believed to diverge below a certain lengthscale — for QED
to be well-defined, then, it needs a cutoff which is above this lengthscale. But
non-Abelian gauge theories — notably QCD and the electroweak theory — do
not have this property: in fact, their interaction strength (as was briefly noted
above) actually decreases with decreasing lengthscale. So there appears to be no
lower limit to the value of the cutoff in QCD or electroweak theory, and there-
fore no mathematical objection (from this source, at any rate) to the existence
of an algebraic version of either.
Now, as I have stressed, I am aware of no positive reason why such a theory
should exist. But suppose, just for the sake of argument, that it does, and
11I presented this argument in a talk at the Western Ontario conference on Philosophy of
Quantum Field Theory, in spring 2009. I’m grateful to Nick Huggett for pointing out that it
does not apply to theories with ultraviolet freedom.
12Again, see Peskin and Schroeder (1995), or any other modern QFT textbook, for details.
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that we managed to find it. What would we gain from this, as physicists or
philosophers?13
So far as I can see, basically nothing. Given any finite lengthscale Λ, we
can reproduce the claims of this hypothesised theory about field expectation
values on lengthscales above Λ, just using the CQFT version of the theory with
a cutoff ≪ Λ. And if we know all the field expectation values on lengthscales
above Λ, we know everything that the theory says about the structure of the
world on lengthscales above Λ.14
But what about the theory’s claims about physics on arbitrarily short length-
scales? And in any case, never mind the structure of the expectation values,
what about what the theory tells us about the nature of reality? Good ques-
tions15 — or rather, they would be if we had any reason at all to trust the theory
on those lengthscales. But hardly anyone thinks we do: once we get down to
Planckian lengthscales, the fiction that spacetime is nondynamical and that
gravity can be ignored will become unsustainable. Whatever our sub-Planckian
physics looks like (string theory? twistor theory? loop quantum gravity? non-
commutative geometry? causal set theory? something as-yet-undreamed-of?)
there are pretty powerful reasons not to expect it to look like quantum field
theory on a classical background spacetime. As such, what QFT (of any vari-
ety) says about the nature of the world on lengthscales below ∼ 10−43m (let
alone below 10−10
43
m, which is a perfectly legitimate lengthscale according to
AQFT) doesn’t actually tell us anything about reality.
An analogy might help. Classical electromagnetism plus pointlike charged
particles is known to be mathematically pathological: the field strength at the
location of the particle is infinite, which makes it difficult at best to work out
how the field affects the particle itself. It’s a moderately interesting mathemat-
ical game to see how the theory could be made rigorous (see Rohrlich (2007)
for a classic account), but it’s only a game, because we know that classical
electrodynamics just isn’t a remotely accurate description of reality below cer-
tain lengthscales and above certain field strengths, and so if we really want to
understand charged particles, we have to do quantum mechanics.16
To sum up: as long as we didn’t have a satisfactory conceptual understanding
13As mathematicians, no doubt we would gain a lot from it.
14Obviously, this presupposes that we don’t need to add hidden variables, or some kind of
dynamical collapse, to QFT in order to extract empirical data from it. Those not persuaded
by either the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics (cf. Saunders, Barrett, Kent, and
Wallace (2010) and references therein), or by operationalist or neo-Copenhagen approaches
to quantum mechanics are invited to draw their own conclusions as to how far the account
of this paper applies to their position; since we don’t at present have a fully satisfactory
dynamical-collapse or hidden-variable version of the Standard Model (though see Colin and
Struyve (2007) and Struyve and Westman (2007) for interesting progress), let alone of some
algebraic-QFT variant of the Standard Model, the question is probably premature in any case.
15Actually, I don’t think questions about the nature (as opposed to the structure) of the
world are good questions at all (cf Ladyman and Ross (2007)), but never mind.
16Arguments like this seem under-appreciated in philosophy of physics, for reasons that
perplex me; the continued attention by philosophers of statistical mechanics to the ‘problem
of measure zero’, which is an artefact of classical physics with no direct quantum-mechanical
equivalent, is another such pseudoproblem (see Wallace (2001) for further discussion).
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of renormalization theory, it was possible to suppose that the only satisfactory
way to understand it was via AQFT. But the success of CQFT in making
conceptual sense of renormalization both undermines the reasons to expect that
we will find interacting AQFTs, and removes the interest in so doing: for any
such theory will say nothing believable about the world that could not already
have been said via a CQFT.
8 Fraser’s defence of AQFT
By and large, philosophical explorations of AQFT have proceeded with little or
no explanation as to why that framework is appropriate for the philosophy of
quantum field theory. An honorable — and refreshing — exception is Fraser
(2009), who explicitly argues that “an interpretation of QFT should be based
on a rigorous axiomatic variant of QFT rather than any of the other variants.”
Fraser engages directly with CQFT (notably in the form which I defended in
Wallace (2006)) and tries to show why it is an inappropriate basis for foun-
dational work; in this section, I will attempt to return the compliment. In
section 8.1 I summarise the context of Fraser’s arguments; in sections 8.2 and
8.3, respectively, I respond to her criticisms of CQFT and her positive case for
AQFT.
8.1 Underdetermination
Fraser begins her discussion by considering 휆휙42 — scalar field theory in two
spacetime dimensions, with a 휙4 interaction term. She considers three variants
of this quantum field theory. The first is a ‘naive’ QFT of the kind used in the
1950s and 1960s, in which infinities are tamed by an unexplained algorithm. The
second and third are, near enough, CQFT and AQFT versions of the theory,
respectively.
(Three points should be noted here. Firstly (as was mentioned above) this
theory really does have a rigorously defined AQFT version, developed by Glimm
and Jaffe — thus far, at least, Fraser is discussing a concrete AQFT, not just a
hoped-for one. Secondly, Fraser refers to the ‘naive’ QFT as a theory, whereas
I would regard it as too conceptually ill-formed to deserve this name — but I
doubt whether this is a difference of substance.
Thirdly, and more interestingly, Fraser’s cutoff QFT incorporates a long-
distance as well as a short-distance cutoff, introduced to tame a different set
of infinities resulting in the divergence of the integrals in the theory at long
lengthscales. This is one place where my earlier disclaimer is relevant: this kind
of long-distance (or ‘infra-red’ divergence) arises because the free-field vacuum
and the interacting-field vacuum (that is, the ground states of scalar QFT with
and without the 휙4 term) differ on arbitrarily long lengthscales and so are
unitarily inequivalent. This really is a case where algebraic methods are required
to understand what is going on. As I have stressed, the point at issue in this
paper is not algebraic vs. non-algebraic methods, it is real cutoffs (represented
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by CQFT) versus no cutoffs (represented by algebraic QFT with its requirement
that fields are definable on arbitrarily small open sets).17
Fraser now argues that we have a real case of underdetermination here: the
CQFT and AQFT versions of 휆휙42 are empirically equivalent (in the sense that
they predict the same scattering cross-sections) but make different theoretical
claims (notably about whether space is discrete18). And she claims that in this
case, there are clear theoretical grounds to prefer the AQFT version: the cutoff
in the CQFT version is ad hoc and unmotivated.
So far, so good: I agree completely. Of course the cutoff is unmotivated:
why suppose there is a cutoff when the theory demonstrably can be defined
on all lengthscales? In the (fairly remote) counterfactual situation where I was
an organism in a world which appeared to be accurately described by 휆휙42, I’d
follow Fraser in assuming, tentatively, that the AQFT version of the theory was
true (while noting, from its empirical equivalence with the CQFT version, that
nothing in the phenomenology thus far observed rules out the failure of the
theory at some as-yet-unprobed lengthscale).
On the basis of this example, Fraser attempts to construe the whole CQFT-
vs-AQFT debate as likewise a case of underdetermination. But I find this in-
comprehensible. The 휆휙42 case is a genuine case of underdetermination, because
we have two empirically equivalent versions of the theory — a CQFT version
and an AQFT version. The case of QED, QCD or the standard model differs
in a rather crucial respect, because we only have the CQFT version. Where is
the underdetermination here?
Let me press the point. In the 휆휙42 case, Fraser advocates that we reject
CQFT because of the actuality of underdetermination, and instead accept an
actual AQFT. But in the four-dimensional case, she advocates that we reject
CQFT because of the mere possibility of underdetermination, and instead accept
AQFT even though physically realistic AQFTs are currently nonexistent.
Although I don’t think Fraser directly addresses this problem with her un-
derdetermination thesis, she does discuss the absence of interacting AQFTs,
which she acknowledges as a concern for her position. She writes, though, that
“[t]his concern can be alleviated by recognising that the formal variant of QFT
is best viewed as a program which has yet to be completed”. Clearly this is cor-
rect, but I’m unclear why this is supposed to help. Lots of research programs
have been “yet to be completed” at various points in history. In some cases,
this was because they would be completed at a later time. In other cases, it was
because they were just wrong, and the problem they sought to solve would be
solved by a different method. It’s not at all clear why Fraser thinks AQFT is in
the former category.
17I discuss this general issue further in I discuss this further in section 4 of Wallace (2006).
In the concrete case of the infra-red divergences of quantum electrodynamics, we can explicitly
see how the inequivalent representations arise: calculations done via an infrared cutoff (usually
imposed as a low-mass limit on the photon) show that the ‘in’ and ‘out’ stage in QED scattering
processes have an infinite expected number of photons, though only a finite expected energy
(Chung (1965); see also Kulish and Faddeev (1970) and, for more recent perspectives, Horan,
Lavelle, and McMullan (2000) and references therein).
18And finite, says Fraser; but see the above comment on infrared divergences.
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Fraser does make some comments about the plausibility of the program’s
ultimate success, but none of them really seem to help. She observes that “QFT
is hardly unusual in requiring refinements over a period of time” — agreed, but
that seems to presuppose that these refinements are the correct ones. And she
claims that “the results that have been obtained so far do not give any reason
to believe that this [an interacting AQFT] [is] an unattainable goal.” This is a
curious attitude to the burden of proof on a scientific research program. If we
want to take AQFT as sufficiently secure that it should be our route to make
foundational claims about the world (and not merely as a promising line of
research), isn’t more needed than this? It’s not at all clear to me that there
were reasons internal to S-matrix theory, or to the old quantum theory, that
gave us “any reason to believe” that they would not succeed. Rather, they were
abandoned because something different came along that solved their problems
more successfully.
I think Fraser’s position here really relies on her view that CQFT does not
solve the problems of QFT successfully, so that AQFT is the only game in
town. That is: her confidence that the AQFT program will succeed is based
on a rejection of my claims, in this paper, that the CQFT program succeeds in
resolving the problems of renormalization. If so, the situation isn’t really one
of underdetermination, as Fraser suggests: it’s one where the only acceptable
(and not just the best) way of making sense of QFT is via AQFT methods.
8.2 Fraser’s reasons to reject CQFT
Why does Fraser make this claim? Her main objection — so far as I can tell —
to the existence of a real short-distance cutoff is that it is ad hoc: “it does not
have an independent motivation” (p.552). She claims that “to the best of my
knowledge — no-one defends the position that QFT offers evidence that space
is discrete” (p.552). She contrasts this case with the case of quantum gravity:
“arguments from quantum gravity that space is discrete are supported by deep
theoretical considerations about how gravity is to be quantized” (p.552). But
she denies that those very “deep theoretical considerations” can be used by the
quantum field theorist to defend the cutoff:
the fact that quantum gravity indicates that space is discrete would
not help to settle the question of how to interpret the cutoff variant
of QFT because gravitational considerations are external to QFT.
The point at issue is whether QFT dictates that space is necessarily
discrete and finite in extent; that is, whether the discreteness and
finitude of space is a foundational principle of QFT.” (p.552)
But the advocate of CQFT should reject this framework. If we’re serious about
understanding our best extant physics and using it to learn about the world, the
right question isn’t “what would the world be like in the hypothetical situation
where there was no gravity and QFT was exactly true”? Addressing this ques-
tion obviously can’t tell us whether to accept AQFT or CQFT, because we get
different answers according to which theory we are taking to be exactly true!
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Nor is the right question “what would it be rational to believe about QFT, if
we lived in a world where there was no gravity but QFT was empirically very
successful”? This question is fairly uninteresting, for the simple reason that
we don’t live in such a world. The scientifically and philosophically interest-
ing question has to be “what is it rational to believe about QFT, given all the
empirical data that we in fact have?”
From this point of view, it’s perfectly reasonable (and not at all ad hoc)
to be motivated to believe in a discrete structure to spacetime because it is
independently motivated by various different strands in theoretical physics, in-
cluding the need for a short-distance cutoff in QFT. And indeed (contra Fraser’s
claim) this position is pretty commonly taken by particle physicists. Peskin and
Schroeder, for instance, write
In QED and other quantum field theories appropriate to elementary
particle physics, the cutoff would have to be associated with some
fundamental graininess of spacetime, perhaps a result of quantum
fluctuations in gravity. (Peskin and Schroeder 1995, p.402)
To be fair to Fraser, her initial discussions of CQFT mostly seem to be
concerned with a version which implements the cutoff via a literal discretisation
of spacetime (a version which, so far as I know, basically no-one advocates).
She distinguishes this from the version of CQFT that I present in this paper
(and in Wallace 2006), in which the actual mechanism imposing the cutoff is
taken to be unknown and the arguments of renormalization theory are deployed
to explain why this does not matter as long as we are interested in the theory’s
claims on scales large compared to the cutoff.
Fraser characterises this strategy (accurately, I think) as changing the ques-
tion of interpreting QFT from “if QFT were true, what would reality be like” to
“given that QFT is approximately true, what is reality (approximately) like”,
a move that (I think!) she is happy to permit. (Correctly so, surely, since
we have excellent reasons to think that (a) QFT is not true, and (b) QFT is
approximately true19.)
8.3 Fraser’s two arguments for preferring AQFT
Even given this way of thinking about interpreting QFT, however, Fraser still
argues for AQFT rather than CQFT as the correct approach. Her reasons are
twofold:
1. AQFT and CQFT do not in fact agree even in the large-scale claims they
make about the world.
19I merely copy Fraser’s term here: I take it that she intends it as a placeholder for whatever
notion of “approximately being right” the scientific realist should use to handle theory change.
My own view is that the right analysis to use here is the sort of structural continuity advocated
by structural realists (see Ladyman and Ross (2007) and references therein; see also section 1
of Wallace (2001).)
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2. Pursuing AQFT rather than CQFT is a better way to find the true theory
to which QFT is an approximation.
The first, so far as I can see, is straightforwardly false on technical grounds. The
methods of renormalization theory tell us that any field theory — including one
which is actually defined on all lengthscales — will look like a CQFT on suffi-
ciently long lengthscales.20 Here “look like” means not merely “is empirically
equivalent to”, but rather “agrees on all long-distance field expectation values”.
And since all structural claims about states in QFT — including highly em-
pirically remote claims about, say, the interior structure of the proton or the
Higgs mechanism — are expressible in terms of the expectation values of field
operators and their derivatives, it follows that CQFT and AQFT must agree on
all structural claims about structures defined on lengthscales large relative to
the lengthscale at which QFT breaks down — that is, they must agree on all
structural claims that we have reason to believe. (This is basically a reiteration
of my argument in section 7.)
Fraser in fact gives two concrete examples of the large-scale inequivalence
of AQFT and CQFT.21 The first is inequivalent representations: she claims
(p.560) that
the cutoff variant does not have even approximately the same con-
tent as algebraic QFT because the cutoff variant has a finite num-
ber of degrees of freedom and therefore does not admit unitarily
inequivalent representations; in contrast, algebraic QFT has an in-
finite number of degrees of freedom and therefore admits unitarily
inequivalent representations. Spontaneous symmetry breaking is one
case in which these unitarily inequivalent representations are put to
use.
Here Fraser is again assuming that CQFT requires both a short- and a long-
distance cutoff; but as I have noted, I (and I think most quantum field theorists)
are happy to grant that long-distance divergences really should be tamed by
algebraic methods, and that QFTs defined on spatially infinite manifolds really
do have infinitely many degrees of freedom, and hence unitarily inequivalent
representations. The issue is not really algebraic vs. non-algebraic methods: it
is a short-distance cutoff vs. no cutoff. It is true, of course, that AQFT has
unitarily inequivalent representations even on spatially finite regions, but this
unitary inequivalence only manifests itself with respect to expectation values
20Again, see (e.g.) Binney et al or Peskin and Schroeder (1995).
21In this part of her discussion, Fraser seems to set aside the fact that we don’t actually have
any interacting algebraic quantum field theory, let alone ones which are empirically equivalent
to the Standard Model. She writes, in fact (p.559) that “even it were granted that QFT
should be regarded as an approximate guide to the ontology of relatively large distance scales,
it does not follow that the cutoff variant of QFT succeeds in describing large-scale ontology.”
— as if there were both cutoff and non-cutoff versions of the Standard Model. But for the sake
of argument, in this part of my discussion I will grant Fraser the (in my view unmotivated)
assumption that there is a quantum field theory in the AQFT framework which is empirically
equivalent to the Standard Model.
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on arbitrarily small spacetime regions, and these are exactly those expectation
values which don’t convey real information about the world.
Fraser’s second example is the existence of quanta (by which she means,
I think, the existence of a Fock-space representation of the theory). She has
argued elsewhere (Fraser 2008) that an interacting AQFT (if it existed) would
not admit such quanta, and states (p.560) that “a theory according to which
quanta exist is not approximately equivalent to a theory according to which
quanta do not exist”.
Well, maybe not, but it is approximately equivalent to a theory according
to which quanta do approximately exist! And if AQFT (more precisely, if this
supposed interacting algebraic quantum field theory) does not admit quanta in
at least some approximate sense, then so much the worse for it: the evidence
for the electron is reasonably conclusive.
Moving on to Fraser’s second argument for AQFT over CQFT in this context
(which she takes (p.559) as a “more important line of objection” ): her position,
basically, is that we should expect that “theory X” (her term, borrowed from
Wallace (2006), for whatever the theory is to which QFT is an approximation)
will resemble QFT not just in its empirical claims but in its underlying structure:
“theory change from QFT to theory X must involve approximate continuity at
the theoretical level and not merely approximate continuity at the empirical
level”. I’m happy to grant this, if by “theoretical level” she means to include
the theory’s field expectation values and their dynamics on lengthscales long
compared to the cutoff: we have plenty of reason, to be sure, to expect a large
degree of structural continuity between QFT and X. But I think she means
something more — something which would serve to differentiate the Standard
Model from her (imagined) algebraic variant. And if so, I have no idea why she
thinks this is the case.
She goes on to claim that
[U]ntil we actually find theory X and can determine the respects in
which there is approximate continuity between theory X and QFT,
we have no way of knowing how useful it would have been to work
out the details of QFT [i. e. , develop AQFT]. The fact remains that
— given our limited knowledge at the present time — continuing to
pursue the development of QFT [i. e. , continuing to work on AQFT]
is a good strategy.
Well, I suppose it might be. Perhaps, if we succeeded in finding an interacting
QFT in the algebraic framework — or if we succeeded in proving that there is
no such theory — it might tell us something salient to the search for quantum
gravity. Who knows? But in any case, what has this to do with the philosophy
of quantum field theory — that is, with the project of learning about the world
by studying the conceptual claims in QFT? Fraser’s argument is an argument
for the first-order project of trying to find interacting algebraic quantum field
theories, not for the philosophical project of asking what the world would be
like if there was such a theory and it correctly described reality.
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(I should note in passing that Fraser also claims that “[r]esting content with
the cutoff variant of QFT because it is empirically adequate at large distance
scales would be a strategic mistake because it would hinder the search for theory
X”. This seems mistaken. For one thing, CQFT does give us some information
about X (not much, to be sure, by the very nature of renormalization theory).
The variation of the coupling constants in the Standard Model on different
lengthscales, in particular, tells us something about ways in which the theory
ought to break down or be modified at lengthscales far below our ability to
probe; notably, one reason to take supersymmetry seriously is that, when we
allow for it — but not otherwise — the strong and electroweak interactions
are compatible with the hypothesis that they are aspects of some larger gauge
group. (See chapter 22 of Peskin and Schroeder (1995), and references therein,
for details.) More fundamentally, though, it is CQFT that forms the theoretical
basis for our best current prospect of gaining empirical evidence of X, via the
LHC.
Fraser deserves considerable credit for making an explicit case for AQFT to
be the basis for philosophy of quantum field theory. But in doing so, I think,
she really succeeds only in showing how surreal is the proposal that philosophy
of QFT should deal, not with the — spectacularly successful — quantum field
theory that we actually have, but with a research program which has yet to give
us any evidence at all that it is correct.
9 Other objections to CQFT
Although I’m not aware of any defences of AQFT (as the basis for philosophy of
QFT) in print other than Fraser’s, I’ve come across various other objections in
conversation with colleagues; here I’ll try to set out, and respond to, the more
common of them.
Objection: CQFT is not Poincare´-covariant.
Response: It’s true that those cutoff schemes we can actually concretely im-
plement (notably, putting the theory on a lattice) violate Poincare` con-
variance (and, indeed, translation and rotation covariance). But provided
that the real cutoff is actually imposed by some Poincare`-covariant theory
(string theory and loop quantum gravity both have this property), this
will just be an artefact of the particular cutoff schemes we’re using at the
moment (and recall that the details of that scheme are irrelevant to the
large-scale structure of the theory).
Having said this, if Poincare´ covariance turns out to be only phenomeno-
logical, so what? (It is worth noting, in this context, that condensed
matter physics manages fine with symmetry based reasoning — reasoning
based on the rotational or translational covariance of many systems, for
instance — even though those symmetries are only phenomenological and
are broken at the atomic level.)
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Objection: CQFT is useless for metaphysics given its underdetermination:
precisely because it tells us nothing about the nature of the cutoff, it’s
not useful to do metaphysical work on it.
Reply: If what you need for whatever metaphysical project you’re engaged in
is structural information about the world on scales large compared to the
Planck length, CQFT will provide that information just fine.
If you’re after something else — structural information about the world
on all lengthscales, say, or non-structural information about the world,
tough. The current state of the art in physics doesn’t tell us any such
information; if you want it, quantize gravity (or go and do something else
until other people have quantized gravity). Don’t think that you’ll get such
information by studying AQFT, though: we have no reason to believe its
claims about what the world is like on sub-Planckian lengthscales (indeed,
we have excellent reasons not to believe them).
(I’ll concede that some people like to ask “if theory 푇 were exactly true,
what would the world be like?”, even though they know that theory 푇 isn’t
exactly true. Those people are welcome to take 푇 = 퐴푄퐹푇 , provided they
don’t kid themselves that they’re discovering what the world is actually
like.)
Objection: CQFT is not mathematically rigorous, so we don’t actually know
the results that it purports to establish.
Reply: Although the mathematical and physical pathologies of pre-1970s QED
made this a reasonable objection prior to the development of renormalization-
group methods, things have now changed, and the level of mathematical
rigor in CQFT is basically the same as elsewhere in theoretical physics.
So applying this standard even-handedly would invalidate practically all
of the theoretical physics of the twentieth century: atomic physics, non-
relativistic scattering theory, astrophysics, nuclear physics, etc, etc.
Objection: CQFT is very ugly; AQFT is much more elegant.
Reply: This is a quite widespread view, but it seems to be held mostly by peo-
ple who haven’t really studied modern field theory in depth. I encourage
them to do so; they may be favourably surprised by how elegant it is.
More seriously, theoretical elegance might be a criterion for theory se-
lection between theories tied for first place with respect to the empirical
evidence. Using it to reject a well-confirmed theory which has made abun-
dant novel predictions in favour of a “theory” that currently doesn’t exist
does violence to the scientific method. (Feel free to hold out for more ele-
gance in whatever physics lies beyond the effective-field regime, of course.)
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10 Conclusion
It has not been my purpose in this paper to disparage the mathematical physi-
cists who continue to search for physically realistic interacting algebraic quan-
tum field theories. Leaving aside the mathematical interest of the task, it is
impossible to know in advance just which mathematical highways and byways
may prove to be a useful source of insights for the future progress of physics.
Let a thousand flowers bloom — so long as it is understood that there is no
requirement in quantum field theory itself that any such theory exists, and that
the apparent paradox of ultraviolet divergences that originally motivated the
axiomatic program in QFT has long since been solved by quite another route.
Nor has it been, and nor is it, my purpose to suggest that philosophy of
quantum field theory done in the AQFT framework has nothing to teach us.
On the contrary, much — perhaps most — of that work probably transfers
across just fine to CQFT. And this includes philosophy of quantum field theory
that makes essential use of algebraic methods — notably in the investigations
of inequivalent representations which arise because quantum field theories, with
or without cutoffs, have infinitely many degrees of freedom when defined on
spatially infinite spacetimes.
But it is the case, I think, that the philosophy of quantum field theory
is needlessly complicated, and often distorted, when it is carried out on the
assumption that interesting QFTs must be formulated within the framework
of cutoff-free algebraic quantum field theory. And that assumption, from the
point of view of twenty-first century theoretical physics, is entirely without
motivation. We possess a concrete example of an interacting quantum field
theory — the Standard Model — and if it does not fit the framework of AQFT,
then so much the worse for that framework. For it is foundationally satisfactory
in its own right — despite, or perhaps because of, its explicit acknowledgement
that it ceases to be defined below some lengthscale. And it is the most widely
applicable, predictively powerful, and precisely tested scientific theory in human
history. If the goal of philosophy of physics is to understand the deep structure
of reality via our best extant physics, then to be lured away from the Standard
Model by algebraic quantum field theory is sheer madness.
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